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Abstract 
We show that tests for adverse selection in annuity markets using prices are not 
identified. Within the UK annuity market, different annuity products create the 
potential for a Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium as different risk types 
could choose different annuities. Empirical analyses using the “money’s worth”  
suggest that prices are indeed consistent with this explanation. However, we show 
that this pattern of annuity prices would also result from the actions of regulated 
annuity providers who must reserve against cohort mortality risk. Annuity 
products that might attract different consumer risk types also have different risks 
for the provider. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the development of the theoretical model of Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) focusing on the rôle of asymmetric information in insurance markets, the 
search for empirical evidence on adverse selection has yielded conflicting findings 
depending on the characteristics of the particular market (Cohen and Siegelman, 
2010).  A common approach has been to investigate the positive correlation 
property (PCP), whereby higher-risk individuals buy more insurance.  In the 
context of life annuities, higher risk corresponds to higher life expectancy and a 
direct test would be that individuals who have private information about their life 
expectancy select into back-loaded annuity products and hence individuals who 
buy back-loaded products live longer.  However, PCP tests are not generally 
feasible because individuals’ purchases of annuities are proprietary information 
and are not widely available.  An alternative test of the same phenomenon is 
whether annuity providers (life insurers) recognise adverse selection and price 
accordingly, leading to different money’s worths for different annuity products. 
Mitchell et al (1999) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) have examined the pricing 
of life annuities using the money's worth (MW) metric, defined as the ratio of the 
expected value of annuity payments to the premium paid. 1   This empirical 
literature generally suggest that: (i) the MW is less than one; and (ii) the MW of 
back-loaded annuities (such as escalating or real annuities where the expected 
duration is longer) is less than that for level annuities. For example, Finkelstein 
and Poterba (F&P) (2002, p.46) reports that the money’s worth of level annuities 
for 65-year old males is 0.900, but for escalating annuities is 0.856. These two 
observations have been interpreted as evidence of adverse selection, that 
annuitants have more information about their life expectancy than insurance 
companies, which is then reflected in equilibrium annuity prices.  
In this paper we evaluate the identifying assumptions used to test for adverse 
selection through analysis of prices in annuity markets. We demonstrate that 
                                                 
1
 James and Song (2001) and Cannon and Tonks (2008) provide an international comparison of 
money’s worth studies across a wide range of countries. Since then further analyses have been 
conducted for Canada (Milevsky and Shao, 2011); for Germany (Kaschützke and Maurer, 2011); for 
the Netherlands (Cannon, Stevens and Tonks, 2012); for Singapore (Fong, Mitchell and Koh, 2011); 
and for Switzerland (Bütler and Staubli, 2011).  
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these same facts would also be consistent with a model where there is no adverse 
selection and where the variation in annuity rates for different types of annuity 
were due to the different costs of supplying annuities.  The providers of annuity 
contracts are exposed to the survival or conversely mortality risks of annuitants. 
Either because life insurers are prudent or because of regulatory requirements, 
riskier liabilities such as escalating or real annuities have to be priced to ensure 
sufficient reserves are available and matched to similar assets and these effects 
make them more costly. Although idiosyncratic mortality risks are diversified in a 
large pool of annuitants, a life insurer still faces the risk from predicting cohort 
mortality over a long period. The route by which this cohort risk and adverse 
selection affect annuity prices is the same, namely the duration of the annuity.  
This makes identifying the importance of the two explanations for annuity prices 
difficult.  In this paper we quantify the costs of these cohort mortality risks and 
show they are sufficiently large to explain much of the observed variations in the 
money’s worth, leaving a smaller rôle for adverse selection.   
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the organisation  
of annuity markets in the UK, review the theory and evidence for adverse selection 
and discuss the consequences of mortality risk for annuity pricing. In section 3 we 
describe the conventional MW measure, examine the implications of adverse 
selection and prudential reserving for the money’s worth, summarise the data used 
in our empirical analysis, and provide time series calculations of the MW by 
annuitant age and product type. In section 4 we show how a probability 
distribution of the value of an annuity can be constructed from a stochastic 
mortality model.  We use this to measure the risk for annuities and the 
consequences when a researcher calculates the MW based on a deterministic 
projection of mortality, but when annuity providers are pricing to take into 
account the financial risk associated with mortality risk and a given set of interest 
rates. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Adverse Selection and Annuity Markets 
In this section we describe the structure and regulation of UK annuity markets 
and explain how the theory of adverse selection developed for general insurance 
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relates to the specific characteristics of annuities markets. We summarise the 
results of MW and PCP tests and discuss whether they constitute evidence for 
adverse selection.  We then discuss the need for life insurers to reserve against 
long-run cohort risk that cannot be diversified away by pooling a large number of 
annuitants and the consequences of this for the pricing of annuities.  
We first describe the structure of the UK’s annuity markets. Due to the 
compulsory annuitisation of wealth accumulated in tax-efficient defined 
contribution personal pension schemes up until 2014, the UK annuity market was 
the largest in the world, accounting for almost half of all annuities sold worldwide 
(worth £11 billion per year; HM Treasury, 2010).2 A variety of annuity types were 
allowed by the tax authorities so, in principle, life insurers could price annuities to 
separate different risk types as described in the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model 
(henceforth RS), and extended to the annuity market by Eckstein, Eichenbaum 
and Peled (1985). The RS model assumes that the insurer can observe the quantity 
of insurance purchased, but this is not a valid assumption in the annuity market. 
Anyone purchasing an annuity would almost certainly have some additional 
annuitised wealth (through pensions or annuities purchased from other providers) 
and non-annuitised wealth (both financial and housing assets), none of which are 
observable by the life insurer. Even if a life insurer did observe the proportion of 
wealth annuitised, an annuitant could still choose to consume less than their 
annuity income initially and save in a non-annuity product and this could 
undermine the ability of life insurers to separate different risk types. Finkelstein, 
Poterba and Rothschild (2008, Figure 4) illustrate numerical simulations showing 
that to separate individuals it would be necessary to offer an annuity product to 
short-lived individuals where payments in the distant future (above age 90) were 
negligible and no such annuity types are observed in practice. In fact, Abel (1985) 
and Walliser (2000) show that the combination of unobservable quantities and 
adverse selection can result in a pooling equilibrium.  We conclude that the 
                                                 
2
 Despite some exemptions and changes to the rules during this period, most individual DC 
pension scheme participants had to annuitise 75 per cent of personal pension wealth accumulated 
in a tax-exempt savings vehicle by age 75. This requirement was removed in March 2014.  
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theoretical literature on annuities is ambivalent on whether adverse selection will 
be characterised by a separating or pooling equilibrium.  
Turning to the empirical evidence, F&P (2002) demonstrate that the pattern of UK 
annuity prices for different product types is consistent with adverse selection. 
There are two general product types that might signal life expectancy: first, 
annuities where the first five years’ payments are “guaranteed” (i.e. not life 
contingent) have less insurance than simple annuities and are more valuable to a 
short-lived annuitant who values bequests (“front-loaded” annuities). Second, 
annuities whose payments are escalating in nominal terms, or indexed to inflation 
are “back loaded” and should be more valuable to longer-lived annuitants. F&P 
(2002) show that the MW of back-loaded annuities are lower than the MW of 
front-loaded annuities, consistent with the predictions of a separating 
equilibrium: henceforth we refer to this as the price test. This price test computes 
the expected present value of an annuity stream, and relies upon using projected 
mortalities. Either implicitly or explicitly these are uncertain forecasts raising the 
question of how to incorporate forecast uncertainty explicitly into the evaluation 
of annuity prices. 
An alternative test for establishing the presence of adverse selection, is to check 
the positive-correlation property (Chiappori et al, 2006), since higher-risk (i.e. 
longer-lived) individuals should purchase more longevity insurance.  Using data 
on individual policies from a life insurer for 1980-98, F&P (2004) show that 
annuitants who purchase an annuity with a guarantee period tend to be shorter-
lived and those who buy an escalating or real annuity are longer lived, consistent 
with the RS separating equilibrium. Using policies from another company for 
1988-94, Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010) find less conclusive evidence, 
since annuitants who purchase an annuity with a ten-year guarantee are longer 
lived than those with a five-year guarantee (and in some cases longer-lived than 
those with no guarantee).   
PCP tests for asymmetric information have been criticised by De Meza and Webb 
(2014) who argue that, under the standard assumptions of actuarially fair pricing 
and identical preferences, the availability of contracts with different insurance 
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coverage implies the existence of asymmetric information. This is because under 
symmetric information all risk-averse individuals would choose full cover: the 
presence of multiple contracts only shows that at least some of the standard 
assumptions are invalid, not that there is asymmetric information. In the context 
of accident insurance, De Meza and Webb propose modifying the standard set of 
assumptions to allow for differential claims-processing costs across contracts, with 
claims costs non-increasing in the level of insurance cover (for example, due to 
fixed costs). The inclusion of such costs can then generate multiple cover levels 
under symmetric information (where individuals will choose their level of cover 
taking into account expected claims costs). When there is asymmetric 
information, a non-zero correlation (between risk-types and cover) does not imply 
asymmetric information; nor does a zero correlation exclude asymmetric 
information. However, this issue of claims-processing costs cannot be simply 
translated to the life-annuity scenario, since life annuities pay a stream of 
payments dependent on life length and there is no direct analogue of a claim or 
associated costs. 
A final issue is that annuity choice may be affected by behavioural issues. A typical  
annuitant might only be expected to purchase one annuity and there is no scope 
for learning about the product through experience: so annuity purchase is a 
plausible scenario for decisions to be affected by framing effects (Benartzi et al, 
2011; Beshears et al, 2013). Indeed, the finding in Einav et al. (2010) that the vast 
majority (87 per cent) of annuities had a five-year guarantee (the “middle option”) 
suggests that choice of annuity type is due to institutional or behavioural factors 
and so selection effects are not just due to asymmetric information.  
We now turn to how cohort mortality risk affects annuity pricing. Compared to 
other forms of insurance, the cost of a providing an annuity is peculiarly difficult 
to estimate because of the long-term nature of the product: a 65-year old 
purchasing an annuity might live for another forty years.  This means that 
estimates of costs must be based upon very long-term projections and introduces 
an element of uncertainty for the insurer that is less important in general 
insurance.  Given that the uncertainty of mortality forecasts increases with the 
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time horizon, it also follows that annuities with a longer duration are also higher 
risk to the annuity provider, suggesting that they may need to offer a lower 
annuity rate if the annuity provider is risk averse or facing regulatory constraints, 
and this would automatically result in a lower MW for back-loaded products. 
Annuities in the UK are sold by life insurers whose liabilities consist of future 
annuity payments, and whose assets are predominantly high-quality bonds. 3 
Annuities payments defined in nominal terms can be matched with conventional 
bonds, and those defined in real terms matched to  inflation-linked bonds,4 so the 
risk to forecasting cohort mortality constitutes the largest component of the total 
risk to selling an annuity.  Because individual annuitants lack either adequate 
incentives or the ability to monitor the solvency of life insurers, there is a 
rationale for government regulation of long-term insurance, which has been 
recognised in the UK since a series of insolvencies of life insurers led to the 1869 
Insurance Act.5  The basis of subsequent prudential regulation is the requirements 
of larger reserves for riskier products so that, even if the life insurer is not risk 
averse, it may still have to behave as if it is.6  Indeed, the regulator may also 
encourage life insurers to price conservatively.  For example, in 2007, the 
chairman of the Financial Services Authority wrote to life insurers recognising that 
                                                 
3
 Life insurers must provide detailed accounts to the regulator referred to as the FSA Returns.  
Where investing in corporate bonds results in a higher yield (a risk premium), life insurers are not 
allowed to use this to value their liabilities.  For example, see the note in Norwich Union Annuity 
Limited, Annual FSA Insurance Returns for the year ended 31st December 2005 (page 53): “In 
accordance with PRU 4.2.41R, a prudent adjustment, excluding that part of the yield estimated to 
represent compensation for the risk that the income from the asset might not be maintained, . . .  
was made to the yield on assets.”  The return goes on to say that AAA-rated corporate bonds had 
yields reduced by 0.09 per cent, A-rate by 0.32 per cent and commercial mortgages by 0.41 per 
cent.   
4
 In the U.K., where inflation-adjusted annuities are sold, it is possible to hedge indexed annuities 
by purchasing government bonds that are indexed to the Retail Price Index. The FSA Returns 
make explicit that the different types of annuities are backed by different assets .  For example, the 
note in Norwich Union Annuity Limited, Annual FSA Insurance Returns for the year ended 31st 
December 2005 (page 50): “Non-linked and index-linked liabilities are backed by different assets 
and hence have different valuation interest rates.”  
5
 More recently a leading insurer (Equitable Life) became insolvent in 2000, resulting in the 
government ultimately agreeing to compensate pensioners in 2010.  Plantin  and Rochet (2009) 
analyse the appropriate role and design of prudential regulation of insurance companies.  
6
 Text books such as Booth et al (2005) say explicitly that, actuaries have always taken risk into 
account when pricing annuities.   
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companies would usually make assumptions based on their own mortality 
experiences, but adding  
“...if this is not possible we would expect firms to consider the different 
industry views in this area and to err on the side of caution.” (FSA Dear CEO 
letter, April 2007) 
The prudential regulations have been strengthened by the EU-wide changes to 
insurance regulation enshrined in Solvency II, which will take effect from 2016.7  
Solvency II applies to the insurance industry the risk-sensitive regulatory approach 
adopted in the Basel reforms for the banking industry.  Under the proposal for 
Solvency II, life insurance companies are required to allow explicitly for 
uncertainty in their valuations: 
"the technical provision under the Solvency II requirement is the sum of the 
best estimate and the risk margin, . . ., the best estimate is defined as the 
probability-weighted average of future cash flows . . . The probability-
weighted approach suggests that an insurer has to consider a wide range of 
possible future events: for example, a 25% reduction in mortality rates may 
have a small probability of occurrence but a large impact on the cash flows. 
However, the assumptions chosen to project the best estimated cash flows 
should be set in a realistic manner, whereas the prudent allowance for data 
uncertainty and model error should be taken into account in the risk margin 
calculation." (Telford et al, 2011; paras. 7.2.1 - 7.2.2.3). 
 
In the UK each life insurer must declare the actuarial assumptions used to value 
its liabilities, by comparing the mortalities (approximately one-year death 
probabilities) used in its own calculations with the mortalities in the benchmark 
tables produced by the Institute of Actuaries’ Continuous Mortality Investigation 
(CMI).  The CMI collects data from all of the major life insurers: aggregates, 
anonymises and then analyses the pooled data.  So the CMI tables of mortality 
approximate to the average mortalities across the whole industry.  The figures 
presented in life insurers’ FSA returns are then compared to this average and are 
summarised in Table 1 and illustrate in Figure 1.8 
                                                 
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/solvency/131002_draft-directive_en.pdf 
8
 The CMI tables include four benchmark life tables for different annuity  groups: PCMA00, 
RMC00, RMV00 and PPMC00. PCMA00 reports the mortalities of members of occupational 
defined-benefit pension schemes administered by life insurers; RMC00 and RMV00 summarise the 
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[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows that for ages above 68, every life insurer assumes lower mortality 
rates than the benchmark.  Some of the variation in assumptions between 
companies must be due to genuine variations in mortality of the annuitants, but it 
is obviously impossible that every company has lower mortality than the average, 
represented by the benchmark.  This is prima facie evidence that firms are 
building some allowance for mortality risk into their valuations.  
In section 3 we show theoretically how prudential reserving requirements will 
affect annuity prices. Since there is no disclosure requirement on the value of 
cohort mortality risk assumed by life insurers, we cannot measure the effect on 
annuity prices from information in the life insurers’ returns . In section 4 we 
quantify mortality risk through the widely-used model of Lee and Carter (1992) to 
show that the effect is large enough to affect MW tests in practice.   
3. Money’s Worth Calculations 
In this section we define the money’s worth of an annuity product and we furnish 
the theoretical proof that it will not equal one if the researcher uses a different life 
table from the life insurer, either due to adverse selection or risk. We then 
describe the data available on annuity price quotes over the period 1994-2012 and 
estimate the money’s worth for this period. 
3.1 The Money’s Worth 
The conventional measure of the value of an annuity is the money’s worth 
(Warshawsky, 1988; Mitchell et al, 1999), which compares the expected present 
value of the annuity payments with the price paid for the annuity.  Consider the 
expected present value of a stream of annuity payments, starting with a unit 
payment and then rising by an escalation factor  0,0.05g  per period for an 
annuity sold to someone age x  at time t  
                                                                                                                                                        
mortality evidence of the original DC pensions - retirement annuity contracts for self-employed 
workers; RMV is for pensioners in receipt of a pension (“vested”) and RMC is for both pensioners 
in receipt of a pension and for those still making contributions (“combined”); and PPMC00 reports 
mortalities of DC personal pensioners.  Using a different benchmark would not affect our 
conclusions. 
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(1) 𝑎𝑥,𝑡(𝑔) ≡ ∑ (1 + 𝑔)
𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡                  𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡 ≡ ∏ 𝑝𝑡+𝑗,𝑥+𝑗
𝑖−1
𝑗=0
∞
𝑖=1   
where Rt,i is the discount factor at time t for a pure discount bond of duration i 
and pt+j,x+j is the one-period survival probability for the annuitant who is age x+j in 
period t+j (that is the probability of living one more period conditional on being 
alive at the beginning of the period) and sx+i|x,t is thus the probability of someone 
aged x at time t living to age x+i or longer. In the absence of administrative and 
marketing costs, 𝑎𝑥,𝑡(𝑔) would be a life insurer’s liability from selling a life annuity 
of unit payments and hence the annuity rate offered by the life insurer would be  
(2) 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑔)𝑥,𝑡 =
1
𝑎(𝑔)𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 =
1
∑ (1+𝑔)𝑖∞𝑖=1 𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 
where we have added the super-script “Life insurer” to s to emphasise that this is 
the survival probability used by the life insurer (calculated at time t, but we leave 
that implicit for notational simplicity). To calculate the MW, a researcher would 
use the formula 
(3) 𝑀𝑊 (𝑔)𝑥,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑔)𝑥,𝑡 × 𝑎(𝑔)𝑥,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 
=
∑ (1 + 𝑔)𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟∞
𝑖=1
∑ (1 + 𝑔)𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟∞
𝑖=1
 
which makes it explicit that the researcher may use different survival probabilities 
from a life insurer. We assume that the researcher correctly identifies the discount 
factors used by life insurers and therefore do not distinguish between the discount 
factors used in pricing the annuity or evaluating the MW. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
With respect to the difference in survival probabilities, we illustrate two possible 
cases in Figure 2. In the first case (Panel A), we assume that there are two types of 
individual, high and low risk, who know their type and know that they have 
different survival probability curves. In an adverse-selection separating 
equilibrium, high-risk types choose escalating annuities (𝑔 = 0.05) and low-risk 
types choose level annuities (𝑔 =  0). Since the type is revealed by annuity choice, 
the life insurer is able to use the correct survival probabilities in pricing the 
annuity. 
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However, the researcher is faced with using data provided by the CMI, which only 
publishes one set of life tables, not distinguishing annuitants with different types 
of annuity.  This pooled life table will have a survival probability denoted by the 
heavy black line in Panel A which lies between the low and high-risk types’ curves.  
Hence the researcher will systematically under-estimate the survival probability 
when calculating the MW of annuities purchased by high-risk individuals and 
over-estimate the survival probability of annuities purchased by low-risk 
individuals.  The estimated MW for level and escalating annuities would be 
𝑀𝑊 (𝑔 = 0, 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑥,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒∞
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘∞
𝑖=1
  
(4)   
𝑀𝑊 (𝑔 = 0.05, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑥,𝑡 =
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒∞
𝑖=1
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘∞
𝑖=1
  
We now demonstrate that the MW of the escalating annuity (𝑔 = 0.05) will be 
lower than that of the level annuity (𝑔 = 0). 
Proposition 1: Where a life insurer sells two annuity types in a separating 
equilibrium, then 𝑀𝑊(𝑔 = 0.05, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑥,𝑡 < 𝑀𝑊 (𝑔 = 0, 𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑥,𝑡  
Proof: We assume that the survival curves for high- and low-risk never cross for 
which a sufficient condition is that the mortality of a high-risk individual is always 
lower than the mortality of a low-risk individual of the same age in the same year. 
In which case the survival probabilities can be ordered as follows 
∀𝑖: 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 < 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 < 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
It then follows that 
∀𝑖: 𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 < 𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑   1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 < 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
Where we assume that the same interest rates are used by both the life insurer and 
the researcher, but where the life insurer is pricing annuities using either the high- 
or low-risk survival probabilities as appropriate, and the researcher uses the 
average survival probability. Summing over all future years: 
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∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 < ∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒,   
𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 < ∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1
𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 
⟹ 1 <
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
, 1 <
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  
⟹ 1 <
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
×
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖
∞
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  
⟹ 1 <
𝑀𝑊 (𝑔=0,𝑙𝑜𝑤−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑥,𝑡
𝑀𝑊(𝑔=0.05,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ− 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑥,𝑡
 QED  
 
In the second case, illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2, we assume there is no 
adverse selection and no separating equilibrium but the life insurer is uncertain of 
future values of the relevant survival probabilities. In line with the Solvency II 
framework, we use the Value-at-Risk (VaR) as a guide to suitable reserving, by 
which we mean that insurers price off the tail of probability distribution of future 
mortality such that there is a 95 per cent chance of having sufficient assets to meet 
the actual risky liabilities. We plot the forecast survival probabilities with a central 
projection and upper and lower confidence intervals. In the conventional MW 
calculations, researchers implicitly use the central projection as the price of the 
annuity contract, but a risk-averse life insurer would price using the upper 
confidence interval and hence the MW would be  
𝑀𝑊 (𝑔 = 0)𝑥,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒∞
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.∞
𝑖=1
  
(5) 
𝑀𝑊 (𝑔 = 0.05)𝑥,𝑡 =
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒∞
𝑖=1
∑ 1.05𝑖𝑅𝑡,𝑖𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.∞
𝑖=1
  
As with the adverse selection case, part of the problem is that the researcher will 
use the “wrong” survival probabilities; conversely in this case the life insurer uses 
the same survival probability curve to value both annuity types. The relationship 
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between these two money’s worths depends on the uncertainty of the forecast of 
future survival probabilities, and the extent to which life insurers’ price annuities 
to take account of mortality uncertainty. Define the range between the average 
and the upper confidence interval of the survival distribution function by the 
“concordance ratio”, 𝜑𝑖, for each future year i, where 
 𝜑𝑖 =
𝑠𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑠
𝑥+𝑖|𝑥,𝑡
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.  
and where we omit x and t subscripts for notational simplicity. If there were no 
uncertainty about future survival probabilities, and if life insurers priced at the 
central projection, then 𝜑𝑖 = 1; but when there is uncertainty about future survival 
probabilities, then 0 < 𝜑𝑖 < 1, and lower values of 𝜑𝑖  are associated with more 
uncertainty. 9  We shall be interested in the scenario: 𝜑𝑖+1 < 𝜑𝑖  i.e. where 
uncertainty increases with the time horizon, and hence the concordance ratio falls 
as projections are made at higher ages.  There are three reasons for the uncertainty 
of survival probabilities to increase over time. First, as is conventionally the case, 
forecast error increases with time horizon. Second, actuarial models forecast 
mortality, but the variable of interest is survival probability: survival probabilities 
further into the future compound a larger number of uncertain death 
probabilities. 10  Third, regardless of the model used, survival probabilities 
immediately after the sale of an annuity will be very close to one: in our data the 
crude death rate for 65-year-olds over the period 1983-2000 is 0.018. The one-year 
survival probability is then 0.982, and the concordance ratio thus cannot be less 
than 0.982 because the upper confidence interval probability cannot exceed one. 
As survival probabilities fall this constraint is relaxed, and so the concordance 
ratio can decrease. Using the definition of the concordance ratio into (5), then 
 𝑀𝑊(𝑔) =
∑ (1+𝑔)𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.
(𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑠𝑖
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.
⁄ )∞𝑖=1
∑ (1+𝑔)𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.∞
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑔)
∞
𝑖=1 𝜑𝑖  
                                                 
9
 The concordance ratio is inversely related to the uncertainty in the survival probabilities. We 
plot a sample concordance ratio for our estimated model in Appendix A.2, which illus trates that 
this ratio is falling (uncertainty increasing) with the time horizon.  
10
 Taking two specific cases from equation (1): 𝑠𝑥+1 = (1 − 𝑞1), which depends on one random 
variable but 𝑠𝑥+2 = (1 − 𝑞1)(1 − 𝑞2) depends on two random variables. 
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where 
 𝑤𝑖(𝑔) ≡
(1+𝑔)𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.
∑ (1+𝑔)𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑠𝑗
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶.𝐼.∞
𝑗=1
 ,    ∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑔)
∞
𝑖=1 = 1 
i.e. MW is a weighted average of our measure of the concordance ratios.  
Proposition 2: Where there is no selection and life insurers prudently price 
annuities from the upper confidence interval, then 𝑀𝑊(𝑔 = 0.05) < 𝑀𝑊(𝑔 = 0) if 
𝜑𝑖+1 < 𝜑𝑖. 
Proof: From the definition of wi (g), an increase in 𝑔 reduces 𝑤𝑖(𝑔) for smaller 
values of i and increases 𝑤𝑖(𝑔) for larger values of i. Since 𝜑𝑖+1 < 𝜑𝑖 , MW is a 
weighted average of the concordance ratios. An increase in 𝑔 adjusts the weights 
so that more weight is placed on the values of  𝜑𝑖  at longer horizons where 𝜑𝑖 is 
smaller (i.e. uncertainty is greater) and hence MW falls.   QED 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in g corresponds to an increase in the expected 
duration of the life annuity: it is more “back-loaded”. These two propositions show 
that a researcher using publicly available data would find the money’s worth for a 
back-loaded annuity to be less than that of a level annuity: this difference may be 
due either to an adverse-selection separating equilibrium or to prudential pricing. 
Our proof that prudential pricing (Proposition 2) results in a lower money’s worth 
for escalating annuities depends on the fact that uncertainty increases with time 
horizon, and back-loaded annuities have a great percentage of the present value at 
longer time horizons. The proof for selection (Proposition 1) depends on the fact 
that higher-risk individuals should choose back-loaded annuities. The two 
propositions share the intuition that the calculated money’s worths will differ : (i) 
because the researcher uses a different set of survival probabilities from the life 
insurer; and (ii) because real and escalating annuities have longer duration than 
level annuities. 
3.2 Description of the data 
Data on UK annuity rates for males at various ages are taken from MoneyFacts 
over the period August 1994 to April 2012, and an average monthly value is 
computed which corresponds to the annuity rate in equation (2).  These are 
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compulsory-purchase annuities which are bought in the decumulation phase of a 
defined contribution pension scheme. 11  The discount factor Rt,j (which we assume 
to be risk free) may be inferred from the yield curve on government bonds at the 
time of the annuity sale. This is likely to be a good approximation to life insurers’ 
rates we have noted above that life insurers predominantly back their liabilities 
with government bonds and have to adjust rates of return on other assets for risk 
so this must be a good approximation to the rates they use.12  Secondly, life 
insurers approximately match their annuity liabilities with government bonds.13 
In Figure 3 we illustrate the annuity rate series for a 65-year old male over time 
compared with government bond data, and summary statistics of these data for 
nominal and real variables are presented in Tables 2 and 3. It can be seen that 
nominal annuities approximately track the nominal bond yield and analogously 
for real annuities: annuity rates are highly correlated with long-term bond yields, 
and the average difference in these two series over the sample period was 2.86%. 
We also compare the two sub-periods up to the financial crisis (Northern Rock 
bank run in August 2007) and since the onset of the crisis. Following the crisis, 
both short-term (base rate) and long-term government bond yields have fallen, 
and this has been reflected in a fall in annuity rates. Level annuities pay a constant 
annuity payment in nominal terms throughout the lifetime of the annuitant; real 
annuities have payments that rise in line with the UK’s Retail Price Index , and 
escalating annuities incorporate an escalation factor of five per cent per annum.  
[Tables 2 and 3, and Figure 3 about here] 
The remaining data that we need to estimate the money’s worth are the mortality 
projections.  We used a series of life tables for annuitants published by the CMI, 
                                                 
11
 For example, in the UK in July 2009, the Prudential would sell an annuity for £10,000 to a 65-year 
old man which would pay a monthly income of £61, or £732 annually for life: the annuity rate 
would be 𝐴2009,65 = 732 10,000⁄ = 7.32%. 
12
 Details of the notional yields, credit ratings and corresponding adjustments are reported in the 
FSA returns; see also footnote 3.  Price risk is relatively unimportant since bonds are typically held 
to maturity. 
13
 CGFS (2011) provides a review of international insurance regulation and notes that thi s matching 
can be duration matching which only partially matches liability and asset cash flows and cash-flow 
matching which perfectly matches the flows.  The footnotes of various FSA returns note that 
perfect matching is impossible and that there is a small residual risk. 
15 
 
and started using each new table from a year before the publication date, on the 
argument that the broad outline of these data may have been known to life 
insurers before actual publication (and life insurers would also have been able to 
analyse the mortality experience of their own annuitants). The PML80 (“Purchased 
Male Life”) table was published in 1992 (“80” refers to the base year).  Although it 
projected gradual increases in life expectancy, by the late 1990s it had become 
clear that the downward trend in mortality of pensioners was much stronger and 
the PML92 tables (published 1999) revised life expectancy up by almost two years.  
Further analysis of the reduction in mortality both for pensioners and people of 
below pension age (for which pension data were unavailable: life insurance data 
were used instead), suggested a “cohort” effect, i.e. a discrete downward jump in 
mortality for people born after about 1930.  This led to a set of “interim 
adjustments” published in 2002: the most widely used “medium cohort” 
adjustment is illustrated here.  In 2005 information on the most recent annuitant 
mortality was published (the “00” table), which did not have an accompanying 
projection for changes into the future.  Accordingly at that time many life insurers 
used the “00” table as a base and then used the “medium cohort” projection from 
2000 (or some other year) onwards. 
3.3 Estimates of the (Conventional) Money’s Worth  
Figure 4 illustrates the MW of the monthly annuity rate data for men in the UK 
compulsory purchase market for three different ages (60, 65, 70,).  We calculate 
the MW using the mortality projections from the relevant CMI tables for each 
period, with a short overlap. It can be seen that each new actuarial table results in 
a discrete increase in the MW due to longer projected life expectancy, but the 
medium cohort projection and the PNML00 projection match almost exactly.  
Within the sample period for a particular mortality table there is an apparent 
decline in MW for males of all ages, with a spike around 2008 reflecting low bond 
yields and downward shift in the nominal term structure, and a delayed reaction 
in terms of reduced annuity rates. The range of money’s worths across the three 
ages fell considerably over time. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
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Although Figure 2 showed a decline in annuity rates of about 2.5 per cent between 
1994 and 2000, Figure 4 shows that this does not correspond to as large a change 
in MW: this fall is mainly explained by falls in interest rates and increases in life 
expectancy.    Table 4 provides formal tests of the differences in money’s worths by 
age, guarantee period, and annuity product type, over the four sub-periods of our 
data corresponding to the relevant actuarial life table. In Panel A of Table 4 we 
compute the average MW by age, and examine whether there are significant 
differences between the MW of annuities at different ages. We test for the equality 
of means of these series, using a “matched pair” analysis to deal with trends in the 
series. We calculate the t-statistic for the mean value of these differences, using 
Newey-West standard errors, with the relevant adjustment for the autocorrelation 
structure. The reversal of MW by age over the period 2001-2004 for 70-year old 
males (t-stat on difference with 65-year old males is -1.94) is inconsistent with the 
suggestion of F&P (2002, p. 41) that lower MW at higher ages is evidence for 
asymmetric information.  14 
[Table 4 and Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
Figure 5 and Panel B of Table 4 shows that there is little difference in MW for 
annuities with different guarantee periods.  Figure 6 and Panel C of Table 4 
reports the MW for level, real and escalating annuities: we are able to confirm that 
back-loaded annuities have significantly lower money’s worths than level annuities 
for each of the sub-samples. For example, for the most recent table 2004-2012 (the 
“00” table), has MW for real and escalating annuities as 0.768 and 0.802 
respectively, and the MW for level annuities as 0.859. Note that the MW of real 
annuities display a negative spike in 2008, which is due to the perverse movement 
in real bond yields at that time, as is clear from Figure 3. Comparing the beginning 
of the period to the end (the two periods when we are relatively confident about 
the appropriate mortality table to use), there is some slight evidence that MW has 
fallen and that the gap between the nominal and real money’s worth has risen.  
The results for the relative MW of real and escalating are more mixed: the gap 
                                                 
14
 Cannon, Stevens and Tonks (2013) analyse the Dutch annuity market and also find an inverse 
pattern of money’s worths by age for the period 2001-2010. 
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between them is often small and sometimes the MW for real annuities is slightly 
higher than for escalating, rather than lower. Overall, our analysis for the money’s 
worth over the whole period largely confirms that of F&P (2002). 15  The caveats are 
that the differences in MW by age or guarantee have disappeared by the end of the 
period.  
4. The Stochastic Money’s Worth  
In the section 3.1, we showed the pattern of observed money’s worths arising from 
life insurers reserving against cohort mortality risk.  Since life insurers do not 
report how they reserve for this risk, we quantify the effect by estimating the 
uncertainty in forecasting the probability of living pt+j, x+j  (equivalently the 
probability of dying) and determining the amount of reserves needed when 
calculating the annuity price using the Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach discussed in 
section 3.16   
The estimation of death probabilities is a staple of actuarial textbooks (Bowers et 
al, 1997; Pitacco et al, 2009), but forecasting these variables is more problematic 
and usually relies on extrapolating the past trend, because models based on the 
causes of death are insufficiently precise to be used for prediction purposes.  The 
very long-term nature of these forecasts, results in estimates that are subject to 
uncertainty from a variety of sources.  
First, there are issues with the timeliness and quality of the historical data. The 
estimates are based on data available only up to time t (or possibly earlier if there 
are lags in data collection): in many countries sufficiently detailed data for p are 
simply unavailable and the U.K. is unusual in having reliable data for pensioners 
over a long time period. Since 1924, U.K. life offices have provided their firm-level 
data on survival experiences to a central committee of actuaries to create a large 
enough data set to enable reliable statistical analysis and long-term projections.  A 
                                                 
15
 A robustness check on the differences in the log-money’s worths is provided in Appendix A.1.  
16
 More formally, mortality   is the continuous-time analogue of the one-year death probability
1q p d    . In this paper we work entirely with one-year death probabilities and ignore the 
issue of when deaths occur within year: the quantitative effect of this is very small.  
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second problem is that observed death rates are only estimates of the underlying 
death probabilities due to sampling error;  this may be particularly acute when 
only small samples are available, which is often the case for the highest ages. A 
third issue is that there may be structural changes in the data generating process 
associated with healthcare improvements over time, including: universal changes 
in health technology affecting all cohorts; the health of annuitants changing 
relative to that of the general population; changes in health due to lifestyle 
changes; or changes in the health of pensioners due to changes in pension 
coverage.  In addition, such changes may have led to selection effects in the types 
of people enrolling into a pension scheme in the first place.  
Our estimated mortality models use the UK’s life office pensioner mortality data, 
which is the largest and most commonly used data set for UK private pensions, for 
the years 1983-2000:17  the typical exposed to risk for a given age in a given year is 
in the range 5,000-10,000, although there are fewer for very high ages.  The total 
exposed-to-risk in 1983 is 356,552 and in 2000 it is 289,019.   
The cohort mortality model we use for our application is Lee and Carter (1992), 
which has been widely accepted as a starting point for mortality analysis.18 Cairns 
et al (2011) consider the forecasting performance of a range of mortality models, 
and by focusing on the uncertainty within the Lee-Carter model we are probably 
under-estimating the effect of model uncertainty on the money’s worth for two 
reasons. First, we make no allowance for different life insurers using different 
                                                 
17 Although detailed data on pensioner mortality were collected in the United Kingdom from 1948 
the data prior to 1983 have been lost (CMI, 2002). In this data set no 60-year old male died in 1998, 
so the log mortality was not defined: we replaced the zero value by 0.5 (which corresponded to the 
lowest mortality rate observed elsewhere in the data set).  A variety of alternative assumptions 
resulted in almost identical conclusions. 
18 Most mortality models’ starting point is Gompertz’s Law: that the logarithm of death rates 
tends to increase linearly with age. In addition, the log of death rates decreases linearly over time.  
Caveats to these statements are: these relationships are only approximately linear; that falls over 
time in mortality may be age dependent; and there are occasional structural breaks. There are also 
issues as to whether one should look at the logarithm of the death rate or an inverse logistic 
function, and whether the decline is a stochastic or deterministic trend (Cairns et al, 2009). In 
Table 6 below, as a robustness check we consider an alternative to the Lee-Carter approach: the 
Cairns-Blake-Dowd (2006) model, which uses the approximately linear relationship between log-
mortality and age as a restriction in the estimation strategy. Details of estimating the Cairns-
Blake-Dowd model and the expected annuity values from different mortality models and different 
sub-samples of the data, are provided in Appendices A.3 and A.4 respectively.   
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models which may add to the model uncertainty, and second within the class of 
mortality models Cairns et al (2011) note that the Lee-Carter model produces 
forecasts that are ‘too precise’ compared with the historical volatility of mortality; 
so our estimates of uncertainty are probably conservative. Lee and Carter (1992) 
model the one-year death probabilities as 
(6) ln(1 − 𝑝𝑥𝑡) = ln 𝑞𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥 + 𝛽𝑥𝜅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑥𝑡     𝜀𝑥𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
which can be estimated by Least Squares (LS) from a singular-value decomposition 
method. Pitacco et al (2008) and Girosi and King (2008) suggest that LS was the 
most widely used estimator and we think it unlikely that life insurers would have 
used Maximum Likelihood (ML) during the period for which we have annuity rate 
data, but we report ML results for comparison. Our baseline results are estimated 
for ages 61-100 for the period 1983-2000 but for robustness we also estimate 
models for ages 60-100 and 65-100. An explanation of the technical issues 
implementing the Lee-Carter model are discussed in Appendix A.2. Regardless of 
the estimation procedure, forecasting is based upon a stochastic trend 
(7)    ∆𝜅𝑡 = 𝜆 + 𝜓𝑡        𝜓𝑡 ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜓
2). 
where the parameters λ and 𝜎𝜓
2   are estimated in a second-stage regression. As a 
robustness check we also consider a model where parameter 𝜅𝑡  follows a 
deterministic trend (Girosi and King, 2008). 
[Figure 7 about here] 
The results of our baseline estimates are illustrated in Figure 7. Consistent with 
Gompertz’s law the alphas and betas are approximately linear in age, and the 
kappa follows something close to a stochastic trend. The fact that beta depends 
upon age shows that the trend in log-mortality is age dependent. 
Using the estimated alphas and betas and with projected kappas, we can project 
survival probabilities into the future using numerical methods: we conduct Monte 
Carlo experiments with 10,000 replications to calculate the probability distribution 
of the relevant stochastic variables (details in Appendix A.2).  Figure 8 shows the 
survival fan chart for a male aged 65 at the end of the period of our data in 2001.  
Such fan charts have been discussed in Blake, Dowd and Cairns (2008): there is 
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relatively little uncertainty about the survival probability for the first few years , 
when the probability of dying is small and there is little scope for uncertainty.  
However, by age 75 there is considerable uncertainty.  Note that an annuity which 
was more back-loaded (had longer duration) would have a higher proportion of its 
present value paid in the period of greater uncertainty and thus would be a riskier 
liability for a life insurer. 
[Figure 8 about here.] 
Underlying the calculations which generate the survival probabilities in Figure 8 
we have 10,000 paths for the survival probabilities and we evaluate the 
corresponding annuity value of each of these for different interest rates to get 
estimates of the density function of the value of an annuity (i.e. the value of 𝑎 in 
equation (1)).  
[Figure 9 about here.] 
These density functions are illustrated in Figure 9 for different interest rates, 
assuming that the yield curve is horizontal.  For example, the probability density 
function when the interest rate is zero has a range between £17.68 and £21.36: if 
the insurance company priced the annuity on the expected value then the present 
value of £1 life annuity would be £19.65 and the implied annuity rate would be 5.11 
per cent.  If the insurance company sold a large number of annuity policies at this 
price, it would break even in expectation but, given the distribution is 
approximately symmetric, about half of the time it would make a loss. If the life 
insurer wished to ensure that it made a profit 90 per cent of the time, it would set 
the price at the 90th percentile of this distribution which would have an expected 
present value of £20.20 and the annuity rate would have to be 4.95 per cent, 
resulting in a MW of 0.97.  Figure 9 also shows that, as the interest rate rises and 
the duration of the annuity falls, both the expected value of an annuity and the 
standard deviation fall. The riskiness of the distribution falls as interest rates rise, 
because with higher interest rates, future uncertainty is discounted more heavily.   
Table 5 shows the consequences for the money’s worth if a life insurer prices 
annuities from the relevant centile of the distribution of annuity values but the 
researcher uses the expected annuity value.  In this table we compute the money’s 
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worth of a £1 annuity, where the expected value of the annuity payments is 
computed as the discounted sum of annuity payments multiplied by survival 
probabilities, but where the annuity is priced at either the 50 th , 90th, or 95th 
centile of the distributions given in Figure 9. When priced from the median, MW 
is approximately one, because the median price and the expectation of the annuity 
payments are virtually the same.  When the life insurer prices from the 90th 
centile, MW is less than one and the discrepancy is larger the lower the interest 
rate (because the duration of the annuity rises and is where there is greater 
uncertainty). At more conservative pricing (95 th centile), the money’s worth are 
even lower. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Panel A of the table shows the effect of changing interest rates and degree of VaR 
pricing for level annuities on the money’s worth of level annuities. Panel B 
computes MW for escalating annuities, which is one type of back-loaded annuity, 
and Panel C reports the difference in the MW between level and escalating 
annuities. We can see from Panel C that at each interest rate, or at each centile of 
the distribution, the MW of the escalating annuity is lower; and the difference is 
just under five per cent when annuities are priced at the 95th centile, and interest 
rates are around five per cent, which is the approximate average value of the 10 
year government bond yield over the period 1994-2012. This difference goes some 
way to explaining the difference in the actual money’s worths of level and back-
loaded annuities in Panels A and C of Table 2 illustrated in Figure 6.   
[Table 6 about here] 
In Table 6 we illustrate the robustness of our results to alternative estimation 
methods and mortality models.  The numbers in Table 6 again show the 
differences between the money’s worth for a level and escalating annuities, and 
where we are assuming that the life insurer prices annuities off the 90th centile. 
The columns reports the results based on: different sub-samples of the data (ages 
60-100, 61-100 and 65-100); different estimation methods (Least Squares or 
Maximum Likelihood); projections based on either a stochastic (S) or 
deterministic trend (D); and different mortality models (Lee-Carter and Cairns-
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Blake-Dowd).  The third column in Table 6 repeats the penultimate column of 
Table 5 Panel C for ease of comparison. In all cases it can be seen that the 
differences in MW between level and escalating annuities are positive, meaning 
that irrespective of the mortality model, the data sample or the assumptions about 
the trend in life expectancies, the money’s worth of level annuities is higher than 
that for escalating annuities when life insurers price at the 90 th centile of the 
annuity value distribution but the researcher uses the expected annuity value. 
Although the CBD results in the final three columns of Table 6 suggest a smaller 
effect on the money's worth than for the Lee-Carter model, comparing these two 
estimates depends partly on which model is considered the better predictor of 
annuity values. In a comparison of six mortality models, Dowd et al (2010) provide 
results suggesting that the CBD model is slightly better at predicting future 
mortalities but that the Lee-Carter model is better at predicting annuity values.  
In Figure 10 we illustrate our final calculations making use of the actual interest 
rates that were used in the money’s worth calculations in Figures 4-6.  The 
diagram shows time series of money’s worths for level, real and escalating 
annuities based on an annuity provider pricing off the 90th centile of the annuity 
distribution. Notice, however, that we are using a constant set of mortality 
projections for the whole period, so our results are not directly comparable with 
the earlier graphs.  Instead, Figure 10 isolates the effect that actual interest rate 
changes would have had on MW calculations had annuities been priced on the 
90th centile. Figure 10 reinforces our calculations in Table 5: a significant part of 
the difference between nominal and back-loaded money’s worths is in part due to 
cohort risk. 
[Figure 10 about here] 
Comparing the money’s worth of the three product types, the figure shows that 
while MW for real annuities is less than that for nominal, it is greater than that for 
escalating annuities, inconsistent with our empirical results in Section 3.2. This 
inconsistency with the data is exactly that same as that noticed by F&P (2002, 
pp.45-46): an adverse selection separating equilibrium would also incorrectly 
predict that the money’s worth for real annuities would be between that of 
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nominal and escalating annuities, given that during the sample period the 
inflation rate has averaged less than the 5%. While our model is unable to fit the 
data in this respect, the inconsistency emphasises the difficulty in identifying the 
two models of annuity pricing: both give the same wrong result since both utilise 
the feature that real and escalating annuities have longer durations than level 
annuities. 
One additional explanation for the lower money’s worth for real annuities is that 
they have additional idiosyncratic risk: the number of real annuities sold is too 
small to achieve portfolio diversification and additional calculations suggests that 
this might reduce the money’s worth by an additional one percent. Details are 
provided in the Appendix A.5. Further, there may be higher costs of managing a 
portfolio of real bonds and some evidence for this is provided in Debt 
Management Office (2013). 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this article we have provided estimates of the money’s worth calculations for 
the UK compulsory purchase market, and have shown that the finding in F&P 
(2002) established from a cross-section of annuity prices in 1998, that back-loaded 
annuities have a lower money’s worth than front-loaded annuities is true over the 
whole period 1994-2012. F&P explain this as an adverse-selection separating 
equilibrium achieved by longer-lived individuals purchasing back-loaded 
annuities. 
We have shown that an alternative model yields the same qualitative conclusions.  
Our model relies upon the fact that life insurers need to reserve against the 
uncertain evolution of cohort mortality, both for prudential reasons and because 
they are required to do so by government regulation.  Because back-loaded 
annuities have a higher proportion of pay-outs in the more distant future, they are 
inherently riskier products and require greater reserves.  
Because our model yields the same conclusions as the F&P (2002) model it is 
impossible to identify the magnitude of the two effects from the data alone.  To 
address this problem we have quantified the importance of cohort mortality r isk 
using the Lee-Carter model. Our results suggest that a substantial proportion of 
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observed differences in money’s worths for different annuity products may be due 
to the relative risk.  Combined with other costs of annuity supply, which are 
conventionally ignored in money’s worth calculations, this suggests a much 
smaller rôle for adverse selection. 
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Figures and graphs 
Figure 1 Mortality assumptions of life insurers 
 
The figure compares the CMI benchmark projected future mortality with the company 
specific mortality assumptions provided in the FSA returns. For explanation of mortality 
tables used see footnote to Table 1. 
 
Figure 2: Two models of survival probabilities. 
Panel A      Panel B 
 
The figure shows survival probabilities as a function of age. Panel A shows the survival 
probabilities for two risk types and the average of these survival probabilities. Panel B 
shows the average survival probability and the upper and lower confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3: UK Annuity Rates (Male, Compulsory Purchase) and Bond Yields 
 
Figure shows monthly time series for 1994-2012 of average annuity rates (across providers) 
for 65-year old male for level and index-linked annuities (1998-2012); yields on nominal 
ten-year government and commercial bonds; and real yields on index-linked ten-year 
government bonds. 
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Figure 4: Money’s worth calculations, level annuities for different ages  
 
Figure shows MW of level annuities for males aged 60, 65, 70 over four sub-periods 
corresponding to relevant mortality tables (PML80 refers to data from 1994-2001; PML92 
refers to data from 1999-2002; medium cohort refers to data from 2002-2005; and 
PNML00 refers to data from 2005 to 2012). 
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Figure 5: Money’s worth calculations, different guarantee periods, male, 65 
 
Figure shows MW of level annuities for males aged 65 by guarantee (none, 5-year, and 10-
year guarantee), over four sub-periods corresponding to relevant mortality tables; see 
footnote to Figure 4.  
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Figure 6: Money’s worth calculations, different types of annuity, male 65 
 
Figure shows MW of level, index-linked (real) and escalating annuities for males aged 65, 
over four sub-periods corresponding to relevant mortality tables; see footnote to Figure 4.   
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Figure 7: Estimated parameters from Lee-Carter Model 
 
 
The figure shows that results of our baseline estimates of the Lee-Carter model, with the 
estimated alphas and betas being approximately linear in age, and the kappa following a 
stochastic trend over the years 1983-2000.  
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Figure 8: Fan chart of survival probabilities, male 65 
This fan chart shows uncertainties surrounding the projections of survival probabilities, 
and this uncertainty is reflected by the shading in the fan charts. The central heavy line 
shows the most likely outcome (median), the two solid lines either side of the median 
show the 75th and 25th percentiles, and the dotted lines show the 95th and 5th 
percentiles. 
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Figure 9: Annuity Value Distributions, male 65 
 
Figure illustrates (for different interest rates, ranging from -1% to 10%) the density 
functions of the present value of a £1 life annuity, based on the distribution of survival 
probabilities. 
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Figure 10: Money’s worths using actual yields 
 
Figure shows time series of money’s worths for level, real and escalating annuities based 
on an annuity provider pricing off the 90th centile of the annuity distribution. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary of mortality assumptions in the FSA returns 
Company Mortality assumption 
Aviva Life 88.5% of PCMA00 
Canada Life 89% of RMV00 (plus further adjustments) 
Hodge Life 65% of PCMA00 
Legal and General 69.5% of PCMA00 (plus further adjustments) 
Prudential 95% of PCMA00 
Standard Life 88.4% of RMC00 
The table reports the mortality assumptions and mortality tables used by the main annuity 
providers. Mortality table PCMA00 provides the mortalities of members of occupational 
defined-benefit pension schemes administered by life insurers;  RMC00 and RMV00 
summarise the mortality evidence of retirement annuity contracts for self-employed 
workers; RMV is for pensioners in receipt of a pension (“vested”) and RMC is for both 
pensioners in receipt of a pension and for those still making contributions (“combined”). 
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Table 2: Monthly Time Series Properties of Nominal Pension Annuity for 65-
year old males and various alternative bond yields 
  Annuity 
Rate for 
65-year 
old males 
Long-term:  
10 year 
Governmen
t Bond Yield 
Short-term:  
Bank of 
England Base 
rate 
Interest 
rates on 
retail 
term 
deposits 
Difference in 
Annuity Rate 
and 
Government 
Bond Yield 
Panel A: Aug 1994 – April 2012 
Mean 7.96% 5.10% 4.43% 3.21% 2.86% 
St.Dev. 1.70% 1.49% 2.09% 1.54%  
Correlation 0.93    
Panel B: Aug 1994 – July 2007 
Mean 8.54% 5.59% 5.34% 3.81% 2.95% 
St. Dev. 1.63% 1.38% 1.07% 1.18%  
Correlation 0.92    
Panel C: Aug 2007 – Apr 2012 
Mean 6.40% 3.77% 1.88% 1.62% 2.63% 
St. Dev. 0.49% 0.79% 2.12% 1.23%  
Correlation 0.88       
The table presents descriptive statistics on the monthly time series of average nominal 
annuity rates in the compulsory annuity market (CPA), long-term and short-term 
government bond yields and rates on retail term deposits, over the period 1994 to 2012 in 
Panel A, and for two sub-periods: 1994-2007 in Panel B, and 2007-2012 in Panel C. Annuity 
data provided by MoneyFacts and all bond data are taken from the Bank of England web-
site. 
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Table 3: Monthly Time Series Properties of Real Pension Annuity for 65-year 
old males and various alternative bond yields 
  RPI-linked 
Annuity Rate 
for 65-year old 
males 
Long-term:  
10 year Real 
Government 
Bond Yield 
Difference in Real 
Annuity Rate and 
Real Government 
Bond Yield 
Panel A: Sept 1998 – April 2012 
Mean 4.93% 1.60% 3.34% 
St.Dev. 0.95% 0.77%  
Correlation 0.81  
Panel B: Sept 1998 – July 2007 
Mean 5.43% 2.02% 3.41% 
St. Dev. 0.78% 0.35%  
Correlation 0.71  
Panel C: Aug 2007 – Apr 2012 
Mean 4.01% 0.80% 3.20% 
St. Dev. 0.34% 0.73%  
Correlation 0.88   
The table presents descriptive statistics on the monthly time series of average real annuity 
rates in the compulsory annuity market (CPA) and real long-term government bond yields 
over the period 1994 to 2012 in Panel A, and for two sub-periods: 1994-2007 in Panel B, and 
2007-2012 in Panel C. 
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Table 4: Testing for Differences in Money’s worths by age, and product type  
  1994.ix -
2000.xii: 80 
Life-Table 
t-test 1998.ix -  
2003.xii: 92 
Life-Table 
t-test 2001.i - 
2004.xii: 
medium 
cohort 
t-test 2004.v -
2012.iv: oo 
Life-Table 
t-test 
Panel A: Different Ages 
Level, NG, male 60 Obs. 77  65  48  96  
Mean 0.886 8.68*** 0.926 5.54*** 0.916 4.64* 0.864 6.55*** 
St.dev 0.011  0.068  0.072  0.024  
Level, NG, male 65 Obs. 77  65  48  96  
Mean 0.866 Base-case 0.909 Base-case 0.927 Base-case 0.859 Base-case 
St.dev 0.013  0.061  0.069  0.021  
Level, NG, male 70 Obs. 77  65  48  96  
Mean 0.845 12.42*** 0.889 6.15*** 0.933 1.94* 0.854 4.16*** 
St.dev 0.016  0.053  0.063  0.018  
Level, NG, male 75 Obs. 41  65  48  96  
Mean 0.812 15.18*** 0.872 6.05*** 0.925 0.2 0.850 4.43*** 
St.dev 0.014  0.046  0.052  0.017  
Panel B: Different Guarantees  
Level, 5-year guarantees, 
male 65 
Obs. 77  65  48  96  
Mean 0.881 29.00*** 0.915 10.67*** 0.932 6.39*** 0.867 48.42*** 
St.dev 0.014  0.059  0.067  0.021  
Level, 10-year Obs.  0  23  35  96  
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guarantees, male aged 65 Mean    0.847 -7.02*** 0.893 -0.81 0.873 -17.80*** 
St.dev    0.029  0.032  0.022  
Panel C: Different products  
Real (RPI-linked), NG, 
male 65 
Obs. 28  64  48  96  
Mean 0.784 18.61*** 0.840 18.57*** 0.867 16.11*** 0.768 15.58*** 
St.dev 0.007  0.063  0.064  0.027  
Escalating 5%, NG, male 
65 
Obs. 0  23  35  96  
Mean   0.770 11.50*** 0.856 7.05*** 0.802 10.14*** 
St.dev   0.042  0.048  0.033  
The table presents money’s worth values for annuities by age, guarantee and product type (real and escalating), for four sub-periods 
corresponding to the relevant mortality tables (PML80 for data from 1994-2001; PML92 for data from 1999-2002; medium cohort for data 
from 2002-2005; and PNML00 for data from 2005 to 2012). The first row in Panel A reports the MW of the base case of a level annuity for 
male aged 65 with no guarantee (NG)  The column “t-test” reports a t-test on the differences of matched pairs, i.e. compares the money’s 
worth of the relevant annuity product with the base-case of the equivalent level annuities NG, male aged 65. The standard errors for these 
tests are Newey-West standard errors with 10 lags. Where *, **, *** denotes significance at 90, 95 and 99 per cent respectively.  
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Table 5: Stochastic Money’s Worth Calculations 
  Panel A: 
Money's worth of level annuities 
Panel B: 
Money's worth of escalating 5% 
annuities 
Panel C: 
Difference in 
money's worth  
Quantile: 0.5 0.9 0.95  0.5 0.9 0.95  0.9 0.95 
Interest 
rate 
          
-1% 1.003 0.899 0.875  1.015 0.825 0.781  0.075 0.094 
0% 1.002 0.910 0.890  1.011 0.843 0.803  0.069 0.086 
1% 1.001 0.920 0.902  1.008 0.860 0.824  0.062 0.078 
2% 1.001 0.929 0.913  1.006 0.875 0.843  0.055 0.071 
3% 1.000 0.937 0.923  1.004 0.889 0.860  0.049 0.063 
4% 1.000 0.943 0.931  1.003 0.901 0.876  0.044 0.055 
5% 1.000 0.949 0.938  1.002 0.912 0.890  0.038 0.049 
6% 1.000 0.954 0.944  1.001 0.921 0.902  0.034 0.043 
7% 1.000 0.959 0.950  1.000 0.930 0.913  0.030 0.037 
8% 0.999 0.963 0.955  1.000 0.937 0.922  0.026 0.033 
9% 0.999 0.966 0.959  1.000 0.943 0.929  0.023 0.030 
10% 0.999 0.969 0.963   1.000 0.949 0.936  0.021 0.026 
Panels A and B of the table shows the money’s worth of a £1 annuity (nominal and escalating  5%) at different interest rates, where MW is 
the ratio of the expected value of the annuity payments, relative to the relevant percentile of the annuity distribution (50th, 90th, and 95th 
percentile). The survival projections are made from the Lee-Carter model in equation (6) using ages 61-100. Panel C shows the difference in 
the respective numbers in the first two panels. 
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Table 6: Difference in money’s worth calculations using alternative mortality mode ls 
 Lee-Carter Cairns-Blake-Dowd 
 Least Squares Maximum likelihood Maximum likelihood 
Data: 
ages 
60-
100 
 61-
100 
 65-
100 
 60-
100 
 61-
100 
 65-
100 
 60-
100 
61-
100 
65-
100 
Trend S D S D S D S D S D S D S S S 
-1% 0.119 0.022 0.075 0.020 0.089 0.025 0.040 0.018 0.077 0.027 0.077 0.028 0.013 0.008 0.010 
0% 0.118 0.020 0.069 0.017 0.082 0.022 0.037 0.016 0.070 0.024 0.069 0.024 0.011 0.007 0.009 
1% 0.113 0.018 0.062 0.015 0.073 0.019 0.034 0.015 0.062 0.021 0.062 0.021 0.010 0.007 0.008 
2% 0.109 0.016 0.055 0.012 0.065 0.016 0.032 0.013 0.055 0.018 0.055 0.018 0.009 0.006 0.008 
3% 0.104 0.014 0.049 0.011 0.057 0.014 0.029 0.012 0.048 0.016 0.048 0.016 0.008 0.006 0.007 
4% 0.099 0.013 0.044 0.009 0.051 0.012 0.026 0.011 0.042 0.014 0.042 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.006 
5% 0.092 0.011 0.038 0.008 0.044 0.011 0.024 0.009 0.037 0.012 0.037 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.006 
6% 0.085 0.010 0.034 0.007 0.039 0.009 0.022 0.008 0.032 0.010 0.032 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.005 
7% 0.079 0.009 0.030 0.006 0.035 0.008 0.020 0.008 0.028 0.009 0.028 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.005 
8% 0.073 0.008 0.026 0.005 0.031 0.007 0.018 0.007 0.024 0.008 0.024 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.005 
9% 0.067 0.007 0.023 0.005 0.027 0.006 0.016 0.006 0.021 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.004 
10% 0.062 0.006 0.021 0.004 0.025 0.005 0.014 0.005 0.018 0.006 0.018 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 
The tables show the difference between the money’s worth for a level annuity and the money’s worth for an escalating annuity, where 
each column reports the results based on a different mortality model (Lee-Carter or Cairns-Blake-Dowd), or a different sub-sample of 
the data. Projection is either via a stochastic trend (S) or a deterministic trend (D) and in all cases it is assumed that the life insurer 
prices annuities off the 90th centile. The third column (model estimated using ages 61-100 and projected with a stochastic trend) 
repeats the penultimate column of Table 5 Panel C.
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